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2026.11.08master_canaryA thread's local buffer outlives its frame, and the canary pthread_create copied into that thread is the same value main checks.Pwn2026.11.07Seccompscanf writes through `addr` instead of `&value`, so the sandbox mode global can be set to 0 and prctl() fails without anyone checking.Pwn2026.11.07Bypass SECCOMP-1The filter kills open, write, execve and execveat — but not openat or sendfile, and sendfile does read and write in one syscall.Pwn2026.11.07tcache_dup2glibc 2.29 added the tcache key check, but modify_heap() writes into a freed chunk, so clearing the key makes every free look like the first.Pwn2026.11.07tcache_dupdelete() frees without NULLing the slot, so the same chunk enters the tcache twice and a later malloc hands back free@got.Pwn2026.07.27basic_heap_overflowNo PIE fixes the address of get_shell, so a 28-byte heap overflow is enough to redirect execution.Pwn2026.06.24awesome-basicsA textbook stack overflow: an 80-byte buffer read with 0x80, overwriting RIP to jump into shellcode.Pwn2026.06.24Sigreturn-Oriented Programming (SROP)Notes on SROP: forging a sigcontext frame so a single sigreturn sets every register at once.Pwn2026.06.23cherrystrncmp only checks the first six bytes, so the rest of the overflow is free to reach the return address.Pwn2026.06.18mmappedOverflow the length argument to mprotect so the real flag page is never protected before it is written out.Pwn2026.06.18validatorNX disabled and a writable GOT, so the shellcode is written directly into the GOT and jumped to.Pwn2026.06.13off_by_one_000A single byte past the end of the buffer is enough to shift the saved frame pointer and take control.Pwn2026.06.12ssp_000Stack canary present, so the exploit reads it out first and writes it back in place during the overflow.Pwn2026.06.11memory_leakageA struct read back without clearing it first leaks adjacent heap memory field by field.Pwn2026.06.11basic_exploitation_003A 32-bit binary with no canary and no PIE, exploited by overflowing into the return address.Pwn2026.06.10Exploit Tech: __environFull RELRO and PIE, so the stack address is leaked through the environ pointer in libc instead.Pwn2026.06.10hookThe binary is linked with -z norelro, leaving the init/fini arrays writable and hijackable.Pwn2026.06.10sintA signed comparison lets a negative length through, which then becomes a huge unsigned size in the copy.Pwn2026.06.01Return to Library (RTL)NX blocks shellcode, so the return address goes to a libc function instead. PIE is off, so the offsets hold.Pwn2026.05.28Return to ShellcodeA canary blocks a direct return overwrite, but the stack is executable, so the shellcode goes there.Pwn2026.05.15oneshot46 bytes into a 16-byte buffer, with a leaked stdout address turning a one-gadget into a working shell.Pwn2026.05.15Reversing Basic Challenge #6Static analysis in IDA of a routine that checks user input character by character.Reversing2026.05.14send_sigThe program forwards a signal number straight to the kernel; the exploit is choosing the right one.Pwn2026.05.14cmd_centerA 24-byte name buffer read with 100 bytes, overflowing into the command string passed to system().Pwn2026.05.13basic_exploitation_002printf(buf) instead of printf("%s", buf) - a format string bug turned into a GOT overwrite.Pwn